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________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
________________
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
This appeal concerns the application of our recent
decision in JELD-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s
Inc.), 607 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2010), establishing a new test for
determining when a “claim” exists under the Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. Plaintiffs Patricia Wright
and Kevin West (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) filed a putative
class action seeking damages related to defects in roofing
shingles manufactured by Owens Corning.1 The District
Court granted Owens Corning‟s motion for summary
judgment, determining that the Plaintiffs‟ claims were
discharged under the confirmed reorganization plan (the
“Plan”) of Owens Corning and certain of its subsidiaries
(collectively, the “Debtors”). Specifically, the Court held
that, based on Grossman’s, the Plaintiffs held “claims” under
the Code, and that the published notices of the Debtors‟
Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases afforded them procedural due
process. We agree that the Plaintiffs held claims under the
Code, but, under the circumstances before us, disagree that
they were afforded procedural due process. Hence their
claims were not discharged. We thus affirm in part and
reverse in part the Court‟s judgment, and remand the case for
further proceedings.

1

The Plaintiffs incorrectly named Owens Corning as the
defendant rather than Owens Corning Sales LLC.
Nonetheless, we continue to refer to the defendant as “Owens
Corning.”
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I.

Background

The Plaintiffs‟ story presents the challenge of
administering unknown future claims in bankruptcy. In late
1998 or early 1999, Wright hired a contractor, who installed
shingles manufactured by Owens Corning on her roof. In
2005, West similarly hired a contractor, who likewise
installed shingles manufactured by Owens Corning on his
roof. They both discovered leaks in 2009, and determined
that the shingles had cracked. Each sent warranty claims to
Owens Corning. It rejected Wright‟s claim in part and West‟s
claim in full. In November 2009, Wright filed a class action
against Owens Corning alleging fraud, negligence, strict
liability, and breach of warranty. West later was added as a
named plaintiff.
Meanwhile, back in October 2000, the Debtors filed
their Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions. In November 2001,
the Bankruptcy Court set a claims bar date of April 15, 2002.
All claimants were required to file proofs of claim on or
before that date. It also approved a bar date notice, which
was published twice in The New York Times, The Wall
Street Journal, and USA Today, among other publications.
The notice directed claimants to file proofs of claim if they
held claims2 that arose prior to the filing of the Debtors‟
bankruptcy cases. It specifically identified claims relating to
“the sale, manufacture, distribution, installation and/or
marketing of products by any of the Debtors, including
without limitation . . . roofing shingles . . . .”
2

The notice defined “claim” as it is defined in the Bankruptcy
Code: “[a] right to payment, whether or not such right is
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured, or unsecured . . . .” 11 U.S.C § 101(5).
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The Debtors‟ bankruptcy proceedings resulted in the
filing of the Plan in June 2006. Soon after, the Bankruptcy
Court approved notices of the confirmation hearing for the
Plan, including a generic notice to most unknown claimants.3
This notice was published in The New York Times, The Wall
Street Journal, and USA Today, among other publications. It
stated, in bold, that the Plan might affect the rights of holders
of claims against the Debtors.
Two other notices of the Debtors‟ bankruptcy
proceedings also were published. In June 2006, notice of the
hearing to consider the disclosure statement was published in
The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, USA Today,
and the Toledo Blade. In November 2006, notice of the
Plan‟s date of confirmation, September 26, 2006 (the
“Confirmation Date”), was published in the same four
publications. The Plan provided for the discharge of all
claims relating to the Debtors under the Bankruptcy Code that

3

For notice purposes, claimants are divided into “known” and
“unknown.” A “known” claimant (or creditor) “is one whose
identity is either known „or reasonably ascertainable by the
debtor.‟” Chemetron Corp. v. Jones, 72 F.3d 341, 346 (3d
Cir. 1995) (quoting Tulsa Prof’l Collection Serv., Inc. v.
Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 490 (1988)). In contrast, “[a]n
„unknown‟ creditor is one whose „interests are either
conjectural or future or, although they could be discovered
upon investigation, do not in due course of business come to
knowledge [of the debtor].‟” Id. (quoting Mullane v. Cent.
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)) (second
alteration in original). On appeal, the parties do not contest
that the Plaintiffs were unknown claimants.
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arose before the Confirmation Date.4 The order confirming
the Plan (the “Confirmation Order”) likewise provided that all
claims arising before the Confirmation Date were discharged.
When the Plaintiffs filed their class action, there was
little dispute as to the effect of Owens Corning‟s bankruptcy
on the Plaintiffs‟ claims against it. Based on our muchmaligned decision in Avellino v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M.
Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), a “claim” under
the Bankruptcy Code did not arise until a cause of action
accrued under applicable non-bankruptcy law—that is, when
a claimant possessed a right to payment. In this context, the
Plaintiffs‟ cause of action did not accrue until the defects in
the roofing shingles manifested in 2009, years after the
Confirmation Date.5 Thus, at the time they filed the class
action, the Plaintiffs were correct to conclude that they did
not hold “claims” under the Code based on the action. But
subsequently we overruled Frenville with our en banc
4

Section 1141 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that
“confirmation of a plan . . . discharges the debtor from any
debt that arose before the date of such confirmation, . . .
whether or not (i) a proof of the claim based on such debt is
filed . . . ; (ii) such claim is allowed . . . ; or (iii) the holder of
such claim has accepted the plan.”
11 U.S.C.
§ 1141(d)(1)(A). “Debt” is defined as liability on a claim. Id.
§ 101(12).
5

This assumes that the applicable law comes from either
Illinois or Pennsylvania, the states where the Plaintiffs reside.
Under either‟s law, as with most states‟ laws, a right to
payment does not accrue until a product defect is evident and
an individual suffers actual damages. See Hermitage Corp. v.
Contractors Adjustment Co., 651 N.E.2d 1132, 1135 (Ill.
1995); Gibson v. Commonwealth, 415 A.2d 80, 83 (Pa. 1980).
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decision in Grossman’s, in which we rejected Frenville‟s
“accrual test,” and in its place established the rule that a
“„claim‟ arises when an individual is exposed pre-petition to a
product or other conduct giving rise to an injury, which
underlies a „right to payment‟ under the Bankruptcy Code.”
607 F.3d at 125.
Based on Grossman’s, Owens Corning filed its motion
for summary judgment, arguing that the Plaintiffs‟ claims
were discharged under the Plan and Confirmation Order.
Before the District Court, the Plaintiffs argued that
Grossman’s is limited to asbestos-related cases, it does not
apply retroactively, and they were not afforded due process
because the notices of the bankruptcy proceedings were
insufficient. The Court rejected these arguments, holding that
the Plaintiffs‟ claims were discharged under the Plan and
Confirmation Order.
On appeal, the Plaintiffs advance two arguments.
First, they argue that the District Court applied Grossman’s
too rigidly, creating the unworkable result that persons who
did not anticipate future tort actions at the time of a
bankruptcy proceeding nonetheless possess claims under the
Bankruptcy Code that are discharged. The test set out in
Grossman’s, they assert, requires that the debtor and claimant
anticipate a future tort action at the time of the bankruptcy
proceedings for a claim to exist. Second, they claim that the
District Court‟s due process analysis fell short because it
based its ruling on our precedent holding that unknown
claimants generally are entitled to notification by publication.
II.

Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§§1332(a) and (d)(2). We have jurisdiction to review the
Court‟s final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a
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district court‟s grant of summary judgment de novo. MBIA
Ins. Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co., 426 F.3d 204, 209 (3d Cir.
2005).
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir.
1995) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “All reasonable
inferences from the record must be drawn in favor of the
nonmoving party,” and we “may not weigh the evidence or
assess credibility.” MBIA Ins., 426 F.3d at 209. For there to
be a genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party
must produce evidence “such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for” it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
III.

Grossman’s and “Claims” under the Bankruptcy
Code

A.

Waiver

In addressing whether the Plaintiffs held claims under
the Bankruptcy Code, we first confront the effect of their
failure to advance to the District Court their argument on
appeal regarding Grossman’s. Before the District Court, the
Plaintiffs contended only that Grossman’s is limited to
asbestos-related claims and should not apply retroactively.
They advance neither argument to us. We generally follow “a
well established principle that it is inappropriate for an
appellate court to consider a contention raised on appeal that
was not initially presented to the district court.” Lloyd v.
Hovensa, 369 F.3d 263, 27273 (3d Cir. 2004). Yet this
principle “is one of discretion rather than jurisdiction,”
Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Bruno, 718 F.2d 67, 69 (3d Cir.
1983), and we may consider an argument raised for the first

9

time on appeal in “exceptional circumstances,” such as the
when the “public interest . . . so warrants.” Barefoot
Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 83435 (3d Cir. 2011)
(quoting Rogers v. Larson, 563 F.2d 617, 620 n.4 (3d Cir.
1977)); see also Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 416
(3d Cir. 2011) (noting that “„the matter of what questions may
be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one
left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be
exercised on the facts of individual cases‟” (quoting Council
of Alter. Pol. Parties v. Hooks, 179 F.3d 64, 69 (3d Cir.
1999)). The principle also is best applied to issues that are
fact-dependent or the resolution of which on a basis not
argued to the district court will surprise the parties. Barefoot
Architect, 632 F.3d at 835.
We believe that the “public interest” weighs heavily
toward our consideration of whether the Plaintiffs held claims
under the Bankruptcy Code. What constitutes a claim has the
potential to affect a wide range of proceedings, the issue is
purely legal, the scope of Grossman’s is generally at issue in
this case, and addressing whether the Plaintiffs held claims
will clarify the test we established in Grossman’s. This is an
appropriate situation for us to exercise our discretion.
B.

“Claims” Under the Bankruptcy Code

Consideration of the treatment of unknown future
claims involves two competing concerns: the Bankruptcy
Code‟s goal of providing a debtor with a fresh start by
resolving all claims arising from the debtor‟s conduct prior to
its emergence from bankruptcy; and the rights of individuals
who may be damaged by that conduct but are unaware of the
potential harm at the time of the debtor‟s bankruptcy. In
overruling Frenville‟s “accrual test,” we recognized that it
had been “universally rejected” based on its conflict with the
Code‟s broad definition of the term “claim.” Grossman’s,

10

607 F.3d at 12021 (quoting Cadleway Props., Inc. v.
Andrews (In re Andrews), 239 F.3d 708, 710 n.7 (5th Cir.
2001)). To repeat, in its place we adopted the rule that a
“„claim‟ arises when an individual is exposed pre-petition to a
product or other conduct giving rise to an injury, which
underlies a „right to payment‟ under the Bankruptcy Code.”
Id. at 125. This rule reflects the Code‟s expansive treatment
of claims even if, as we acknowledged, that treatment is to the
“disadvantage [of] potential claimants, such as tort claimants,
whose injuries were allegedly caused by the debtor but which
have not yet manifested and who therefore had no reason to
file claims in the bankruptcy.” Id. at 122.
The rule is an amalgam of the two tests that other
Courts of Appeals generally follow—the conduct test and the
pre-petition relationship test. Under the former, a claim arises
“when the acts giving rise to [the] liability were performed,
not when the harm caused by those acts was manifested.” Id.
See Watson v. Parker (In re Parker), 313 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir.
2002); Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198 (4th Cir.
1988). Under the pre-petition relationship test, “a claim
arises from a debtor‟s pre-petition tortious conduct where
there is also some pre-petition relationship between the debtor
and the claimant, such as a purchase, use, operation of, or
exposure to the debtor‟s product.” Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at
123. See Epstein v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors
(In re Piper Aircraft Corp.), 58 F.3d 1573, 1576 (11th Cir.
1995); Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268 (5th
Cir. 1994); United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay
Corp.), 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991). Cf. ZiLOG, Inc. v.
Corning (In re ZiLOG, Inc.), 450 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2006)
(adopting a “fair contemplation” test, which is similar to the
pre-petition relationship test).
Drawing on the tests‟
similarities, we noted that in the typical case “there seems to
be something approaching a consensus among the courts that
a prerequisite for recognizing a „claim‟ is that the claimant‟s

11

exposure to a product giving rise to the „claim‟ occurred prepetition, even though the injury manifested after the
reorganization.” Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 125. Consistent
with that consensus, the Grossman’s test requires that a
claimant be exposed to a debtor‟s product or conduct prepetition. It requires individuals to recognize that, by being
exposed to a debtor‟s product or conduct, they might hold
claims even if no damage is then evident.
As applied to the Plaintiffs, we easily conclude that
Wright held a claim. She purchased shingles manufactured
by Owens Corning in late 1998 or early 1999. Her exposure
to Owens Corning‟s products predated its bankruptcy
petition. We applied the test announced in Grossman’s
retroactively to the claimants in that case. Id.; see also In re
Rodriguez, 629 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2010) (retroactively
applying Grossman’s to Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings
begun in 2007). We thus apply the Grossman’s test
retroactively to Wright to conclude that she held a claim.
Whether West held a claim is less obvious. He
purchased his shingles in 2005, after Owens Corning filed its
bankruptcy petition but before the Plan was confirmed. In
Grossman’s, we were not confronted with post-petition, preconfirmation exposure, and thus based our test on pre-petition
exposure. We, however, noted that the Eleventh Circuit
Court has extended the pre-petition relationship test to postpetition, pre-confirmation relationships. Grossman’s, 607
F.3d at 124 (citing In re Piper, 58 F.3d at 1577). It reasoned
that “changing the focal point of the relationship from the
petition date to the confirmation date” would be more
consistent with the policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code,
including its broad definition of the term “claim” to afford
debtors a fresh start. In re Piper, 58 F.3d at 157758 n.5.
Indeed, the Code provides that confirmation of a plan
“discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the
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date of such confirmation.” 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A)
(emphasis added). See also id. § 348(d) (providing, in the
context of conversion from a Chapter 11 or Chapter 13
proceeding to a Chapter 7 proceeding, that claims other than
priority claims arising after the petition date, but before
conversion, are treated as pre-petition claims in the Chapter 7
proceeding); id. § 502(e) (providing that “a claim for
reimbursement or contribution . . . that becomes fixed after
the commencement of a case” is a pre-petition claim for
purposes of allowance).
Not extending our test to post-petition, but preconfirmation, exposure would unnecessarily restrict the
Bankruptcy Code‟s expansive treatment of “claims” that we
recognized in Grossman’s. It also would separate artificially
individuals who are affected by a debtor‟s products or
conduct pre-petition from those who are affected after the
debtor‟s filing of its bankruptcy petition but before
confirmation of a plan. We thus restate the test announced in
Grossman’s to include such exposure and hold that a claim
arises when an individual is exposed pre-confirmation to a
product or other conduct giving rise to an injury that underlies
a “right to payment” under the Code. As West‟s exposure to
Owens Corning‟s shingles occurred pre-confirmation, he also
held a claim.
IV.

Due Process

Though the Plaintiffs held claims under the
Bankruptcy Code, those claims may not have been discharged
by the Plan and Confirmation Order. Discharge of the claims
of future unknown claimants raises questions regarding due
process.6 Notice is “[a]n elementary and fundamental
6

Having determined that the Plaintiffs held “claims” under
the Code based on Grossman’s, the District Court first held
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requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be
accorded finality . . . .” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). Lack or inadequacy of
notice of a bankruptcy prevents a claimant from having the
opportunity to participate meaningfully in a bankruptcy
proceeding to protect his or her claim. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 342(a) (“There shall be given such notice as is appropriate .
. . of an order for relief . . . under [the Bankruptcy Code].”).
Inadequate notice accordingly “precludes discharge of a claim
in bankruptcy.” Chemetron Corp. v. Jones, 72 F.3d 341, 346
(3d Cir. 1995).
As the District Court noted, we generally hold that for
unknown claimants, like the Plaintiffs, notice by publication
in national newspapers is sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of due process, particularly if it is supplemented
by notice in local papers. Id. at 34849. But whether
that the claims were discharged pursuant to the Confirmation
Order before considering whether the notices afforded the
Plaintiffs due process, a concept rooted in fairness and
applicable to bankruptcy through the Fifth Amendment of our
Constitution. See SLW Capital, LLC v. Mansaray-Ruffin (In
re Mansaray-Ruffin), 530 F.3d 230, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).
However, if a claimant is not afforded due process, a plan of
reorganization and confirmation order that purport to
discharge claims will not do so. See Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at
127 (“A court therefore must decide whether discharge of the
. . . claims would comport with due process, which may invite
inquiry into the adequacy of the notice . . . .”); Jones v.
Chemetron Corp., 212 F.3d 199, 209 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[I]f a
potential claimant lacks sufficient notice of a bankruptcy
proceeding, due process considerations dictate that his or her
claim cannot be discharged by a confirmation order.”).
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adequate notice has been provided depends on the
circumstances of a particular case. Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at
127. Due process requires “notice reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections.” Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314; see also
SLW Capital, LLC v. Mansaray-Ruffin (In re MansarayRuffin), 530 F.3d 230, 239 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The level of
process due to a party prior to the deprivation of a property
interest . . . is highly dependent on the context. As the
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, „[t]he very nature
of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures
universally applicable to every imaginable situation.‟”
(quoting Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 189,
196 (2001)) (alteration in original)).
Though the Debtors‟ notices were sufficient as to most
unknown claimants, the Plaintiffs‟ situation differed
significantly from that of the typical unknown claimant. At
the time the Plaintiffs received their notices, Frenville was the
law in our Circuit (though we refrain from saying “good”
law). As noted, under the Frenville test the Plaintiffs did not
hold “claims” under the Bankruptcy Code. On reading the
notices, the Plaintiffs could only understand that their rights
would not be affected in any way by the referenced
proceedings, and thus, correctly, would not have taken any
action to ensure that their interests were represented. Not
until we overturned Frenville and established our new test for
determining when a claim exists under the Code did the
Plaintiffs unexpectedly hold “claims” that arguably could be
discharged in the proceedings addressed in the notices. By
that time, however, the bar date had passed, the Confirmation
Order had been entered, and the Confirmation Date had
occurred, each of which affected the Plaintiffs‟ newfound
claim status without an opportunity for them to be heard.
Due process affords a re-do in these special situations to be
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sure all claimants have equal rights. We thus hold that, for
persons who have “claims” under the Bankruptcy Code based
solely on the retroactive effect of the rule announced in
Grossman’s, those claims are not discharged when the notice
given to those persons was with the understanding that they
did not hold claims.7

7

Given our reliance on the exceptional circumstances created
by the retroactive application of Grossman’s, we express no
opinion on the broader issue of whether discharging unknown
future claims comports with due process. See generally
Laura B. Bartell, Due Process for the Unknown Future Claim
in Bankruptcy—Is This Notice Really Necessary?, 78 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 339 (2004). In this vein and consistent with our
statements that whether due process has been provided
depends on the circumstances of a particular case, our holding
is not a bright-line rule that all persons with unknown future
claims once governed by Frenville could not have been
provided due process regardless of the adequacy of notice to
those future claimants.
For example, in some bankruptcy proceedings a future claims
representative is appointed to represent and protect the
interests of persons with future unknown claims. These
representatives are appointed, in part, to address the broader
issue of whether discharging unknown future claims comports
with due process. See, e.g., id. at 340. Indeed, future claims
representatives
have
been
appointed
by
courts
notwithstanding their conclusion that those unknown persons
did not hold “claims” under the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g.,
New Nat’l Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co. Settlement Trust
(In re Nat’l Gypsum Co.), 219 F.3d 478, 48081 (5th Cir.
2000); In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1043 (3d Cir.

16

Because we now explicitly extend the Grossman’s test
to include post-petition, pre-confirmation exposure to a
debtor‟s conduct or product, there are two groups of persons
holding “claims” based on the Grossman’s test who, at the
time they were given notice of a bankruptcy proceeding,
would understand that they did not hold claims. The first
group comprises those who hold claims based on Grossman’s
rejection of the Frenville test—that is, persons exposed to a
debtor‟s conduct or product pre-petition. As to these persons,
due process calls for the outcome of the Frenville test to
apply for bankruptcy cases in which reorganization plans are
proposed and confirmed prior to June 2, 2010, when
Grossman’s was decided. After that date, persons exposed to
a debtor‟s conduct or product pre-petition are deemed to
understand that they held claims.
In contrast, because the Grossman’s test is limited to
pre-petition exposure, persons exposed to a debtor‟s conduct
1985). Because a future claims representative was not
appointed in these bankruptcy cases, we leave open whether,
when such a representative provides persons with unknown
future claims an opportunity to participate in the bankruptcy
case through that representation, they are afforded due
process through otherwise adequate notice to the future
claims representative. See, e.g., Jones v. Chemetron Corp.,
212 F.3d 199, 209 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[I]f a potential claimant
lacks sufficient notice of a bankruptcy proceeding, due
process considerations dictate that his or her claim cannot be
discharged by a confirmation order. Such due process
considerations are often addressed by the appointment of a
representative to receive notice for and represent the interests
of a group of unknown creditors.” (internal citations
omitted)).
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or product post-petition, but pre-confirmation, would
continue to conclude that they did not hold claims. Hence the
second group is comprised of persons who hold claims based
on our decision today extending the Grossman’s test. Due
process requires that the outcome of the Frenville test will
continue to apply to their claims in bankruptcy cases where
reorganization plans are proposed and confirmed prior to the
date of today‟s decision.
*

*

*

*

*

Because at the time of the Confirmation Date Frenville
controlled the status of their “claims,” the Plaintiffs were not
afforded due process. Accordingly their claims were not
discharged by the Plan and Confirmation Order, and they
retained their cause of action against Owens Corning. In this
context, the District Court correctly determined that the
Plaintiffs held “claims” under the Bankruptcy Code. But it
should not have held that those claims were discharged, and
thereby granted summary judgment to Owens Corning, in the
circumstances before us. We thus affirm in part and reverse
in part the District Court‟s judgment, and remand the case to
that Court for further proceedings. The shadow of Frenville
fades, but more slowly than we would like.
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